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Symposium on Intergenerational Equity and Discounting
This issue brings together the essays presented at a conference at
The University of Chicago Law School in April of 2006. The essays
focus on how we should count future generations when considering
projects that will have lasting effects. The most important and prominent example is global warming. Although global warming may have
some immediate effects, most of the effects of global warming will be
felt in the future. If we are to spend money today to abate global
warming, we must understand how to measure the benefits to future
generations against the costs incurred by the present. Many other projects have long term effects as well. For example, a decision on where
to store radioactive wastes may have effects lasting many thousands of
years into the future, and we must have a method of comparing the
costs and benefits today with the potential costs and benefits in the
future of any given storage mechanism. The goal of the essays in this
volume is to shed light on this important question.
Most analysts (and we believe all of the essays in the conference)
take the position that future generations should count, and most likely
count equally to those currently alive. The major question comes
down to the choice of a discount rate, how we compare cash flows occurring at different time periods. In everyday life, we use present values and future values to compare costs and benefits that occur in different times. Companies, for example, might make an investment today in the hope of turning a profit in the future. To determine whether
the investment is worthwhile, they discount the costs and benefits to a
single time period. When we consider public projects that can last
generations, however, the effect of discounting can seem inappropriate. If far enough in the future, benefits can be reduced merely by the
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mathematics of discounting to near zero. Thus, it is standard in analyses of the issue to show that with a long enough time period and a
high enough discount rate, it is not worth spending trivial amounts
today to save millions or billions of individuals living in the future. The
alternative, a zero discount rate, produces similar absurdities. Suppose
we discover that there is a policy in place that will reduce future output by a small percentage, say 1/100 of a percent, starting in two hundred years. If the economy grows over that time period, this small percentage of the future economy will be larger than a huge percentage
of today's output. Without discounting, we would want to incur those
costs today to prevent this future harm.
The discounting effect is so powerful that it can drive the entire
analysis of the problem. For example, since the time of the conference
but before the publication of this volume, the British Treasury published the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change.' The
review, done by a well known public finance economist, Sir Nicholas
Stern, was startling for its claims about the large potential losses from
global warming and the need for dramatic current actions. It was particularly startling because it used standard models and data but produced quite different conclusions from other studies. (Most models,
while showing that climate change abatement is worthwhile, produce
relatively modest results.) The difference, it turns out, was driven by
the discount rate. The Stern Review used a discount rate that was effectively zero while standard models have a positive rate. We could
alternatively imagine the Bush Treasury issuing a report, using standard models and data, that concluded that global warming abatement
was not desirable with the difference arising solely because of the assumed discount rate.
Because of its importance, the issue of how to treat events occurring long in the future has long attracted significant attention from
lawyers, philosophers, economists, and environmental activists. A
number of Nobel Prize winning economists have weighed in on the
issue, and several other conference volumes have previously been
published. Notwithstanding the volume of prior work, there remains
no consensus on the proper discount rate. The essays in this volume
provide some new arguments and additional perspective on this de1 Her Majesty's Treasury, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (2006), online
at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent-reviews/stem-review-economics-climate-change/
sternreviewjreport.cfm (visited Jan 29,2006).
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bate. As would be expected, the essays come to no single conclusion,
although most of the authors believe that a positive discount rate is
appropriate. Most of the authors also believe the precise discount rate
depends on a variety of empirical as well as ethical factors, such as the
estimate of the future productivity of the economy and the ability of
the current generation to transfer resources to the future through
means other than the particular project (that is, if we are going to
spend money today to help the future by abating global warming but
we might want to see if we can spend the same money today and help
the future even more by engaging in other projects). Although this
means that after reading the essays presented here, we will not know
that the right discount rate is a particular number, we think that we
now have a clearer understanding of how to arrive at such a number.
David A. Weisbach
Cass R. Sunstein
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